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ABSTRACT
Increasingly finding themselves in fiscal straightjackets, states have been turning to 
austerity measures, tax increases, privatization of services, and renegotiation of collective 
bargaining agreements.  Absent a federal government bailout, however, states will also 
need debt relief if their debt burden becomes so crushing that reasonable efforts at fiscal 
reform will fail to avoid default.  Some advocate providing this relief by, effectively, 
extending municipal bankruptcy law to states.  That approach brings in excess baggage, 
however, engendering political opposition and constitutional concerns.  There is a simpler 
solution: Enable states to work out their debt problems with their creditors.  Although 
the main obstacle to consensual debt restructuring is likely to be the creditor-holdout 
problem, this Article proposes a minimalist legal framework incorporating certain 
limited bankruptcy protections that would not only help states solve that problem, 
but would also help address the political and constitutional concerns.  The proposed 
minimalist framework also would enable a state to obtain needed liquidity during the 
debt-restructuring process. Although the federal government could provide this liquidity, 
the proposed framework would enable the liquidity source to be privatized.
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INTRODUCTION 
In response to “a third year of multi-billion-dollar budget deficits,”1 U.S. 
states have been turning to austerity measures, tax increases, privatization of 
services, and renegotiation of collective bargaining agreements to mitigate their 
budget shortfalls.2  There is a rising consensus, however, that these measures 
will not be enough, and that states will also need debt relief.3  The goal of 
debt relief would not be to undermine the responsibility of states to engage 
in appropriate fiscal reform.  Rather, debt relief would be needed if a state’s debt 
burden becomes—and in some states, like California, the burden soon may 
be—so crushing that any reasonable efforts at fiscal reform will fail to avoid 
default absent other measures, most significantly a federal government bailout. 
An orderly mechanism for achieving debt relief would benefit residents of 
financially troubled states otherwise subject to diminished government services 
and higher taxes.  It also would minimize the externalities caused by poorer res-
idents, who depend on essential state services or subsidies, relocating from states 
cutting services and subsidies to those not faced with massive budget deficits.4 
Debt relief would also minimize the risk that a state debt default will trig-
ger systemic consequences.  For example, if a default by one state undermines 
investor confidence in all state debt, the broader market in that debt might 
 
  
1. State and Municipal Debt: The Coming Crisis?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Servs., 
and Bailouts of Pub. & Private Programs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 112th 
Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Nicole Gelinas), available at http:// 
www.publicsectorinc.com/psi_articles/2011/02/state-and-municipal-debt-the-coming-crisis.html. 
2. See, e.g., NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N & NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, THE 
FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES 8 (Fall 2010) (“In fiscal 2010, the actions taken most consistently 
were targeted cuts [to state budgets], which were put in place by 33 states, as well as across 
the board cuts, which were utilized by 26 states . . . . To eliminate fiscal 2011 budget gaps, 35 
states are using specific, targeted cuts [to state budgets], while 25 states have employed across 
the board cuts.  Another method being used by 19 states is to reduce aid to localities while 
13 states made use of their rainy day funds.”). 
3. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 1 (opening statement of Rep. Patrick McHenry, Chairman, H. 
Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform) (observing that the “vast majority of states now find 
themselves in a fiscal straightjacket”). 
4. Cf. HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 510 (9th ed. 2010) (observing that 
within the United States, “individuals vote with their feet and locate in the community that offers 
the bundle of public services and taxes they like best”).  Additionally, any subsidies provided by the 
federal government to the troubled state would indirectly be funded by taxing residents of 
other states.  Borrowing by the federal government to fund these subsidies could also increase 
the federal budget deficit. 
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collapse.5  That collapse, in turn, might undermine confidence in other debt 
markets, such as corporate bond markets.  This type of contagion occurred in the 
2008 financial crisis when investor loss of confidence in rated mortgage-
backed securities triggered a broader loss of confidence in all rated-debt 
securities.6  A state debt default might also trigger systemic consequences by 
causing one or more (of the remaining) monoline insurance companies to fail.  
These companies, which are thinly capitalized, guarantee payment to investors 
on a wide range of municipal, state, and corporate bonds.7 
Perhaps most importantly, the creation of an orderly mechanism for achiev-
ing debt relief would reduce the inevitable political pressure on the federal 
government to bail out defaulting states.8  If a federal bailout were to occur, the 
resulting moral hazard—that a state, anticipating a bailout, would lack incentive 
to take a prudent fiscal course—and too-big-to-fail dilemma would likely dwarf 
that of financial institutions, which are at least somewhat disciplined by the threat 
of being liquidated.9 
Some commentators, including prominent politicians and bankruptcy scho-
lars, view bankruptcy law—in particular, Chapter 9 of the Federal Bankruptcy 
Code, which governs municipal (such as city and county) bankruptcy—as 
a more promising solution to state budget deficits.10  This viewpoint is not 
  
5. Cf. infra note 101 (indicating disagreement over the extent to which contagion is likely to 
result).  There are no recent, and few historical, examples of states defaulting.  Arkansas 
defaulted on its debt during the Great Depression, and eight states—Arkansas, Illinois, 
Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, and Pennsylvania—as well as the then–
Territory of Florida defaulted on their debts following the financial panic of 1837.  STANDARD 
& POOR’S, U.S. STATE RATINGS METHODOLOGY 6 (2011). 
6. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical 
Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349 (2011). 
7. See, e.g., MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., THE CHANGING BUSINESS OF FINANCIAL 
GUARANTY INSURANCE 6 (2008); MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., MOODY’S PORTFOLIO 
RISK MODEL RESULTS FOR FINANCIAL GUARANTORS 2–3 (2006); SECURITY CAPITAL 
ASSURANCE, YEAR-END 2007 OPERATING SUPPLEMENT 17 (indicating that, at year-end 
2007, 43.1 percent of the obligations guaranteed by Security (now Syncora), one of the largest 
monoline insurance companies, was municipal and state debt and the balance was corporate 
and asset-backed debt). 
8. Cf. Hearing, supra note 1 (opening statement of Rep. Patrick McHenry, Chairman, H. Comm. 
on Oversight and Gov’t Reform) (observing that “already state and municipal governments are 
coming to Washington, hat-in-hand, expecting a federal bailout like everyone else”). 
9. But see Richard C. Schragger, Debt, Democracy and the Fiscal Constitution (May 4, 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that states and municipalities have 
“forced austerity requirements” and “cannot tax and spend as they wish”); Email From Richard 
C. Schragger, Professor of Law, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, to author (May 3, 2011) (on file with 
author) (questioning whether bailouts at the state or municipal level actually foster moral hazard). 
10. See, e.g., Jeb Bush & Newt Gingrich, Op-Ed., Better Off Bankrupt, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2011, at 
A19; David Skeel, A Bankruptcy Law—Not Bailouts—for the States, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2011, 
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surprising: Bankruptcy law is an obvious mechanism of debt relief, and a 
bankruptcy scholar naturally looks to the tools of the craft.11 
But extending municipal bankruptcy law to states, whether by including 
states in Chapter 9 or by adding a new Chapter to the Bankruptcy Code to 
cover states, can bring in a lot of excess baggage.  States are very different from 
municipalities.  Being semi-sovereign, states do not necessarily need the protec-
tion, for example, of the automatic stay.12 
The excess baggage can even obscure consideration of potentially useful 
applications of bankruptcy law.  Thus, one scholar argues that state bankruptcy 
does not fit the traditional rationales for bankruptcy because state assets are 
not subject to a “grab race” by creditors,13 and also because states, unlike muni-
cipalities (and, of course, unlike corporations), have unlimited taxing powers 
and therefore can raise sufficient money to pay their debts.14  That argument 
dismisses any application of bankruptcy law to states.15 
That goes too far, however.  Certain limited but important bankruptcy law 
protections can be applied under a minimalist framework to help states consen-
sually solve their debt problems.  I begin the analysis by explaining the problems 
faced by states in attempting to restructure their debt. 
  
at A17; David Skeel, Give States a Way to Go Bankrupt, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 29, 2010, at 22 
[hereinafter Skeel, Give States a Way to Go Bankrupt]. 
11. Cf. ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE FOX 26 (Guernsey Press 1992) (1953) 
(observing that “to a cobbler there’s nothing like leather”). 
12. Municipalities receive this protection under 11 U.S.C. § 922 (2006).  I am not claiming that 
states would not benefit from this protection, merely that the other protections discussed below 
should be more important to states.  Cf. The Role of Public Employee Pensions in Contributing 
to State Insolvency and the Possibility of a State Bankruptcy Chapter: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Judiciary Comm., 112th Cong. 2 
(2011) (statement of the Nat’l Bankr. Conf.)  [hereinafter Statement of the Nat’l Bankr. Conf.] 
(observing that “[a] creditor of a State is usually restricted by that State’s law from seizing State 
property” and also that “a State enjoys sovereign immunity, which prevents a suit against the 
State”).  For a more complete discussion of sovereign immunity, see infra notes 62–69 and 
accompanying text. 
13. Adam Levitin, Professor of Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Presentation at the 2011 Annual 
Meeting of Fellows of the American College of Bankruptcy (Mar. 19, 2011) (notes on file with 
author).  A grab race is a type of collective action problem in which creditors who first seize 
assets recover those assets to the detriment of competing creditors.  Nouriel Roubini, Do We 
Need a New Bankruptcy Regime?, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2002, at 
322–23 (noting a “grab race” problem as “creditors . . . initat[ing] litigation to recover their 
claims . . . [by attempting to] seize or attach . . . assets”). 
14. Levitin, supra note 13. 
15. Id.  Levitin also asserts that applying bankruptcy—a financial and legal solution—to what is 
essentially a political problem would be a recipe for political instability.  Id. 
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I. ANALYSIS 
Some traditional rationales for bankruptcy, such as preventing grab races, 
are not critical in the context of a semi-sovereign state.16  But the power of a 
state to tax its residents does not eliminate the importance of at least some 
bankruptcy protections.  A state’s taxing power is not unlimited in practice.17  At 
some point, an increase in the tax rate will cease to raise tax revenues.18  
Taxpayers will lose the incentive to earn income, or they will engage in more tax 
planning to reduce their effective tax rate,19 or they will move to other states, caus-
ing economic output (and tax revenues) of the troubled state to decline further.20 
Thus, while the full scope of bankruptcy protections is not needed, states 
still need a mechanism to work out their debt problems with their creditors. 
A. Enabling States to Work Out Their Debt Problems 
Debt problems are generally worked out through negotiation between a 
debtor and its creditors to restructure the terms of the debt.  A meaningful debt 
restructuring usually involves changing such essential payment terms as the 
amount of principal, the rate of interest, and the maturities.21  The overall 
goal is to reduce debt payments, including the timing of such payments, to 
levels viewed by the debtor as manageable and by its creditors as realistic given 
  
16. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (observing that states do not necessarily need the 
protection of the automatic stay). 
17. Some states’ taxing power is not even unlimited in law.  See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 3; 
see also Schragger, supra note 9 (observing that “state taxing authority is often limited by state 
constitutional provisions”). 
18. Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction 
to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 466 (1993) (discussing the difficulty of 
“identifying the tax-maximization point on this implicit ‘Laffer Curve’”). 
19. See, e.g., Robert Carroll, The Economic Cost of High Tax Rates, FISCAL FACT, July 2009, at 2, 
available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/ff182.pdf. 
20. Steven L. Schwarcz, Global Decentralization and the Subnational Debt Problem, 51 DUKE L.J. 
1179, 1184 (2002) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Subnational Debt]; Steven L. Schwarcz, Subnational 
Debt Restructuring and the Rule of Law, 1 J. RESTRUCTURING FIN. 129 (2004); see also Charles 
M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956) 
(describing communities as competitors for residents who “vote with their feet” by moving to 
the communities that offer the most ideal mix of goods and services, including the tax levels 
used to finance those goods and services). 
21. Schwarcz, Subnational Debt, supra note 20, at 1219–20. 
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the debtor’s circumstances.22  A debt restructuring between a debtor-state and 
its creditors should ordinarily follow this pattern.23 
The central problem faced by debtors attempting to restructure their 
debt—and thus likely to be faced also by debtor-states attempting to restructure 
their debt—is the “creditor-holdout” problem, a type of collective action prob-
lem.24  In any debt restructuring, one or more creditors may strategically hold out 
from agreeing to a reasonable debt-restructuring plan.  The holdouts hope that 
they either will receive full payment of their claims25 or that the imperative 
of other creditors to settle will persuade those creditors to allocate to the holdouts 
more than their fair share of the settlement.26  A holdout may also hope that 
other creditors will purchase the holdout’s claim.27 
The creditor-holdout problem can severely impede a debt restructur-
ing.28  Indeed, the very existence of holdouts can undermine the willingness 
of other creditors to agree to a reasonable restructuring plan.29 
The creditor-holdout problem is likely to be especially severe in the 
context of a state trying to restructure its debt.30  A high percentage of state 
debt is typically in the form of bonds.31  Any meaningful debt restructuring 
involves changing essential payment terms of the bonds,32 which usually requires 
  
22. Id. at 1186. 
23. Cf. id. at 1186–89 (observing this pattern for debt restructurings between subnational 
governmental entities and their creditors). 
24. Cf. id. at 1219–20 (identifying the creditor-holdout problem as the principal debt problem in 
any subnational debt restructuring). 
25. In practice, however, most holdout creditors prefer to seek a settlement rather than to litigate 
for full payment because of the high cost of litigation.  See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, 
Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA L. REV. 59, 60 n.2 (2000).  This should 
especially be the case when the litigation is against a semi-sovereign state.  Cf. infra notes 62–
69 and accompanying text (discussing state Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit).  Some 
judges may be reluctant, as a matter of public policy, to grant judgment to holdout creditors 
against a state.  Cf. In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278, 286 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) (allowing 
debtor LTV Steel to use cash collateral in violation of its contract with creditors, thereby 
keeping LTV Steel in business and avoiding the unemployment and regional economic 
impact that would result from its failure).  Moreover, a court might dismiss, as bad faith, a lawsuit 
brought to pressure other parties to give the litigant more than its fair share of the settlement.  
See infra notes 111–113 and accompanying text. 
26. Schwarcz, Subnational Debt, supra note 20, at 1186. 
27. Id. 
28. Cf. id. at 1220 (explaining this in the broad context of any subnational debt restructuring). 
29. Id. at 1220 n.231. 
30. Another reason for this severity, discussed infra notes 132–139 and accompanying text, is that 
states sometimes issue debt through multiple authorities. 
31. Chris Edwards, State and Local Government Debt Is Soaring, TAX & BUDGET BULL., July 
2006, at 1, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/tbb/tbb_0706-37.pdf (“Most state . . . debt 
takes the form of long-term bonds.”). 
32. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
A Minimalist Approach to State “Bankruptcy” 329 
 
unanimous bondholder consent.33  The diversity of bondholders and the fact 
that their identities constantly change as bonds are publicly traded make it 
extremely difficult to reach unanimity.34 
In an attempt to mitigate a similar creditor-holdout problem in bonds 
issued by sovereign nations, issuers and underwriters of these bonds sometimes 
include collective action clauses (CACs) in the bond indentures.35  CACs permit 
essential payment terms to be amended with the consent of a supermajority, 
as opposed to all, of the bondholders.36  By analogy, CACs may well be seen as 
a potential solution to the creditor-holdout problem of states.  
There are, however, at least two fundamental limitations to CACs.  The 
first is that CACs are not always included in bond indentures.37  In the recent 
Greek debt crisis, for example, 90 percent of the total debt was not governed 
by CACs.38  Indeed, since 2003 there has been a “quiet revival of unanimous 
consent,” with at least four nations issuing sovereign debt requiring unanim-
ous consent to change certain significant provisions.39 
  
33. Schwarcz, Subnational Debt, supra note 20, at 1220.  Even if individual state bond issues were 
to require less than unanimous consent for these types of changes, there would still be the 
potential for a creditor-holdout problem across the state’s bond issues.  See infra notes 48–49 
and accompanying text. 
34. Schwarcz, Subnational Debt, supra note 20, at 1220; cf. Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, 
A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law, 46 J. FIN. 1189, 1193 (1991) 
(finding that “bank debt restructurings . . . are substantially easier to organize than public debt 
[i.e., bond] restructurings”). 
35. Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options: An Analytical Comparison (Mar. 
7, 2011) (work in progress) (manuscript at 11–12) (on file with author).  A bond indenture is 
simply the agreement setting forth the terms and conditions of the bonds—effectively, a type 
of loan agreement.  
36. Id; see also BARRY EICHENGREEN, TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
ARCHITECTURE 65–70 (1999); Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 25; Christopher Greenwood 
& Hugh Mercer, Considerations of International Law, in BARRY EICHENGREEN & 
RICHARD PORTES, CRISIS?  WHAT CRISIS?  ORDERLY WORKOUTS FOR SOVEREIGN 
DEBTORS 110 (1995). 
37. Although an issuer can try to include collective action clauses (CACs) in its bond indentures 
at a later stage by engaging in exchange offers with exit consents—effectively replacing existing 
debt claims with debt securities governed by CACs—such an effort would be subject to practical 
and legal constraints.  See infra notes 41–46 and accompanying text. 
38. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Pricing Terms in Sovereign Debt Contracts: A Greek 
Case Study With Implications for the European Crisis Resolution Mechanism 2, 13–14 (Univ. of 
Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 541, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1713914; Mitu Gulati & Lee C. Buchheit, How to Restructure 
Greek Debt 2 (Duke Law Scholarship Repository, Working Paper No. 2336, 2010), available 
at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2336. 
39. Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Innovation After the Revolution: Foreign Sovereign Bond Contracts 
Since 2003, 4 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 85, 99 (2008). 
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Relatively few state bond issues currently include CACs or their equiv-
alent.40  Although states responding to a financial crisis could try to insert 
CACs into their bond indentures, doing so could be difficult.41  The most 
viable means of accomplishing this would be for a state to engage in exchange 
offers with exit consents, in which the state offers its creditors the option of 
exchanging their debt claims for new debt securities that include CACs.42  To 
try to induce creditors to agree to the exchange, states often employ a variant 
on the prisoner’s dilemma—requiring consenting creditors to waive any 
covenant protections of the old debt securities that can be waived without 
unanimous creditor consent, so creditors who do not submit to the exchange 
will find those covenant protections gone if the number of creditors agreeing 
to the exchange (which any given creditor will not know in advance) is suffi-
cient to waive those covenants.43  In a sovereign context, for example, Ecuador 
used this strategy in its 2000 debt restructuring.44  Even if this strategy otherwise 
works, however,45 questions remain of the extent to which it represents 
unenforceable coercion.46 
  
40. I reviewed several state bond indentures randomly selected by the Duke Law School reference 
librarian and found that all required unanimous bondholder consent to change essential payment 
terms.  Cf. Nancy A. Peterman, David D. Cleary & Elizabeth J. Sickelka, Restructuring Challenges of 
Tax-Exempt Bond Financing for Health Care Facilities, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2010–Jan. 2011, 
at 18, 72 (discussing when restructuring the terms of state and municipal bonds requires 
unanimity).  Although state bonds are not subject to the Trust Indenture Act’s requirement 
of unanimity (they are exempted by Trust Indenture Act § 304(4)(A)), many state bond indentures 
are patterned on corporate bond indentures, which, in turn, are governed by the Trust Indenture Act 
and therefore require unanimity.  Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 316(b), 15 U.S.C. § 
77ppp(b) (2006). 
41. Steven L. Schwarcz, ‘Idiot’s Guide’ to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1189, 
1203 (2004). 
42. Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 25. 
43. See id. 
44. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., SOVEREIGN RESTRUCTURINGS: PUTTING TOO MUCH 
FAITH IN EXIT CONSENTS (2001). 
45. Cf. Stephen J. Lubben, Why Chapter 11 Cases Are Shrinking, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, Dec. 
27, 2010, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/27/why-chapter-11-cases-are-shrinking (noting 
the “conventional wisdom . . . that exchange offers almost never work”).  Ecuador’s bonds lost 
about 40 percent of their net present value as a result of Ecuador’s exchange offer with exit 
consents.  Schwarcz, supra note 41, at 1194 n.25 (referencing the exchange offer described in the 
text accompanying note 44, supra). 
46. See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, A Politically Viable Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 
53 EMORY L.J. 997, 1015–16 (2004) (observing that “even some supporters of a contractual 
approach have questioned whether courts would be willing to enforce exit consents that radically 
altered the nonpayment terms of the bond contract”); Schwarcz, supra note 41, at 1191 n.6, 
1203 (questioning whether exchange offers with exit consents should be enforceable); Michael 
M. Chamberlin, Remarks Prepared for the Bear Stearns & EMCA Sovereign Creditors Rights 
Conference: At the Frontier of Exit Consents (Nov. 8, 2001) (noting that “some bond terms 
(notably governing law, right of acceleration for non-payment, waiver of sovereign immunity 
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A second limitation to CACs is that even if all of a state’s bond inden-
tures included CACs, these clauses (being contractual) would most likely work 
on an agreement-by-agreement basis.47  Therefore, any group of bondholders 
that fails to achieve the requisite supermajority vote would itself be a holdout 
vis-à-vis other creditors.48  It thus is unlikely that CACs, either currently or in 
the future, could ever completely resolve the creditor-holdout problem in state 
debt restructuring.49 
Solving the creditor-holdout problem therefore remains the primary task 
of any state debt-restructuring mechanism.  Solving that problem is also one of 
the central goals of bankruptcy law.50 
1. Towards a Minimalist Framework 
A minimalist legal framework incorporating across-the-board supermajority 
voting51 is all that would be required to help states solve the creditor-holdout 
problem.  Such a framework would not need to bring in other bankruptcy 
baggage.  It nonetheless would be desirable for the framework to also include52 
a mechanism that enables states to obtain needed liquidity during the debt-
restructuring process.53 
  
and submission to jurisdiction) seem so fundamental to a sovereign bondholder’s payment 
rights that they should not be changed without its consent” and that the likelihood that “courts 
will uphold such fundamental changes by exit consent as within the intent of the parties is 
doubtful but remains to be seen”).  But cf. Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986) 
(upholding a corporate exchange offer with exit consents). 
47. Schwarcz, supra note 41, at 1203–05.  Although, theoretically, the parties to each bond indenture 
could agree to a master CAC that operates across all bond indentures, it would almost certainly 
be difficult, if not impracticable, to obtain agreement from all those parties. 
48. Cf. Anna Gelpern, What Bond Markets Can Learn From Argentina, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Apr. 
2005, at 20–21 (stating that when Argentina was trying to negotiate debt-restructuring 
terms in 2001, several hedge funds, together with groups of individual investors, refused Argentina’s 
proffered draconian restructuring proposal and litigated, even though 70 percent of bondholders 
had already agreed to the proposal). 
49. Cf. Hal S. Scott, A Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign Debtors?, 37 INT’L LAW. 103, 129 (2003) 
(concluding that “[t]he insertion of collective action clauses in sovereign bonds is an exercise 
in futility”). 
50. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2006) (providing for supermajority voting to attempt to solve the 
creditor-holdout problem). 
51. See infra Part I.B (explaining this as, effectively, across-the-board supermajority voting by pari 
passu creditors). 
52. See infra notes 140–146 and accompanying text (proposing model framework that includes 
such a mechanism). 
53. The focus of the framework on across-the-board supermajority voting to help solve the creditor-
holdout problem and on liquidity is inspired by the minimalist sovereign debt restructuring 
Proposed Model Convention proposed in Appendix I to Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 
infra note 110.  That Convention also inspired both the Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
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This Article next examines how a minimalist framework could operate.  
It then compares the framework’s benefits and potential drawbacks.  Thereafter, 
the Article examines how the framework could be supplemented to enable 
states to obtain liquidity during the debt-restructuring process while at the same 
time protecting existing creditors.  Finally, Appendix A to the Article provides 
possible model language for a federal statute implementing the framework, 
and Appendix B provides a flowchart illustrating possible application of 
that statute. 
2. Operation of the Framework 
Once a state opts to apply the framework,54 the state’s creditors would be 
bound to a form of across-the-board supermajority voting on a debt-restructuring 
plan.  Under bankruptcy law, for example, a supermajority is defined as creditors 
holding at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in number of the 
creditors eligible to vote.55  The vote by the applicable supermajority of substan-
tially similar (that is, at least pari passu) creditors would legally bind dissenting 
creditors, including creditors of different bond issues.56 
Upon application of the framework, the state would have the right to 
propose a debt-restructuring plan to its creditors, with the goal of obtaining 
the requisite supermajority agreement of each class of substantially similar 
creditors whose debt is affected by the plan.57  This incentivizes the state to 
propose a plan that not only eases its debt burdens but also would be regarded 
as acceptable by its creditors.  Reaching a mutually agreeable plan would thus 
almost certainly involve a reiterative process, including submission of a plan, 
creditor feedback, submission of a revised plan responding to that feedback, 
possible creditor feedback on the revised plan, and so forth until the state has 
designed a mutually agreeable plan. 
  
Convention (SDRC) proposed in the Appendix to ‘Idiot’s Guide,’ supra note 41, and the 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) proposed by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).  See Proposals for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM), INT’L 
MONETARY FUND (Jan. 2003) http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdrm.htm.  Neither 
the SDRM nor the SDRC, nor any other international debt-restructuring convention, has yet 
been put into force under international law. 
54. This Article does not purport to address the internal state governance procedure, which could 
vary from state to state, by which a state would opt to apply the framework.  Cf. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 301 (likewise not addressing the internal corporate-governance procedure by which a firm 
opts to file a voluntary bankruptcy case). 
55. Id. § 1126(c). 
56. See infra note 57. 
57. This type of voting, in contrast to voting under CACs, see supra notes 48–49 and accompanying 
text, would work across all bond issues whose claims are pari passu. 
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Although there is no assurance that a state and its creditors will be able 
to reach a mutually agreeable plan, both sides should have incentives to act 
reasonably.58  The state, as mentioned, will want to ease its debt burden.  
Easing that burden should also help to increase the state’s credit rating,59 and 
states are “enormously concerned with their credit ratings.”60  Creditors, on the 
other hand, will want to reach a resolution that enables them to be paid on a 
current basis and to avoid the costs and uncertainties of litigating against 
a semi-sovereign state with limited payment capability.61  These costs and uncer-
tainties are exacerbated by the Eleventh Amendment,62 which generally bars 
lawsuits against states in federal court.63  It is clear that bondholder and other 
creditor suits would be included in this bar.  The Eleventh Amendment was 
passed in direct response to a Supreme Court decision that a creditor could 
sue a state in federal court to collect on Revolutionary War debts;64 and in a 
line of cases resulting from the “Bond Wars” of the late nineteenth century,65 
  
58. Although public choice theory suggests the potential for state officials’ views of reasonableness 
to differ from that of their constituents, debt restructuring should offer few opportunities for 
that divergence in views.  Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. 
L. REV. 1035, 1090–91 (1997). 
59. Cf. Screeching to the Precipice: Argentina’s Debt Restructuring, ECONOMIST, Feb. 26, 2005, at 
75 (observing the increase in Argentina’s credit rating after its unilateral debt restructuring).  The 
Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution would prohibit a state from engaging in a unilateral 
debt restructuring (for example, dictating to its creditors how the state’s debt should be 
discounted and repaid, such as California legislating that it need only pay 75 percent of its 
outstanding debt).  See infra note 83 and accompanying text; cf. M. DAVID GELFAND, STATE 
& LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING § 1:14 (2010)  (observing that “[t]he Contract 
Clause was enacted during an economic depression following the American Revolution to protect 
creditors whose rights were being abrogated by a flurry of [state] debtor relief legislation”). 
60. Telephone Interview With Alan Hirsch, Policy Dir. for the State of N.C., Chief Policy 
Advisor for Governor Michael Easley (2001–09), and former Deputy Attorney Gen. of N.C. 
(Mar. 31, 2011) (notes on file with author).  A credit rating is “an assessment of the likelihood 
of timely payment on [debt] securities.”  Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: 
The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 6. 
61. Among other defenses a state might raise is that the creditor is acting in bad faith.  Cf. infra 
notes 111–113 and accompanying text (discussing when bad faith might arise). 
62. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”).  
63. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999). 
64. See Thomas E. Plank, State Sovereignty in Bankruptcy After Katz, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 59, 68–70 (2007). 
65. “Bond Wars” refers to the efforts by bondholders to seek judgments in federal court to prevent 
southern states from repudiating war debt.  See John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and 
State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1974 (1983). 
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federal judges have mostly refused to hear disputes that could ultimately 
operate against state treasuries.66 
Admittedly, the Eleventh Amendment does not completely bar creditor 
lawsuits against states.  A creditor could choose to sue a debtor-state in state 
court instead of federal court, and also could attempt to procure a state’s waiver 
of its Eleventh Amendment immunity in order to sue in federal court.  The 
option of suing a financially distressed state in its own courts is unattractive, 
however.  And though it appears settled that a waiver by a state of its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity would be enforceable,67 such waivers are relatively 
rare; states typically consent to suit only in their own courts.68  Furthermore, 
even if a state were to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity, some legal 
experts believe such waivers can be revoked.69 
Creditors therefore should have sufficient incentives to act reasonably under 
the framework to try to reach a mutually agreeable debt-restructuring plan.  The 
framework nonetheless lacks two additional incentives that, in a corporate 
bankruptcy, can help a debtor and its creditors reach agreement on a debt-
restructuring plan.  One incentive motivates the debtor to act reasonably: A 
debtor that fails to reach a debt-restructuring plan can be liquidated.70  The 
  
66. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663–65 (1974); Gibbons, supra note 65, at 2001–
04.  Although Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 359 (2006), holds 
that states cannot raise sovereign immunity as a defense in a preference action instituted by a 
debtor in bankruptcy, the facts of that decision are easily distinguishable and, even given its facts, 
that decision has been widely criticized.  See, e.g., Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards 
a Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 644 (2008) (labeling 
Katz as “problematic,” but suggesting that the case indicates that Congress’s bankruptcy powers 
are not limited by sovereign immunity); Plank, supra note 64, at 93–94 (criticizing the 
reasoning in Katz, and suggesting that future encroachments into state sovereign immunity 
might result in a reconsideration of the Court’s holding in Katz). 
67. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 675–76 (recognizing that states may waive Eleventh 
Amendment immunity). 
68. A review of randomly selected state bond indentures and state statutes revealed no effective 
waivers by states of sovereign immunity in federal court.  See Memorandum From Greg McKay, 
Research Assistant, Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, to author (June 6, 2011) (on file with author).  
Although most states waived sovereign immunity in state court, that immunity is unrelated to the 
Eleventh Amendment.  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 745–46 (1999).  It is clear that “a state does 
not consent to suit in federal court merely by consenting to suit in the courts of its own creation.”  
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 675–76 (also requiring a clear declaration of intent to be sued in 
federal court for a state to have waived its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity). 
69. Telephone Interview With Roger L. Davis, Partner & Chair of the Pub. Fin. Dep’t at Orrick, 
Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (May 27, 2011) (observing that some bond counsel believe that 
Eleventh Amendment waivers by states are revocable and that one bond counsel opines that such 
a waiver is merely “valid,” not “valid and binding”—the latter formulation being the typical generic 
legal opinion as to validity). 
70. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2006). 
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other incentive motivates creditors to be realistic in their expectations:71 A court 
can potentially cram down a debt-restructuring plan over the objection of a class 
of creditors.72  Neither of these incentives would appear to apply in a mea-
ningful way to state debt restructuring.  As a political if not constitutional matter, 
states cannot be liquidated.  Cramdown depends on the ability to value the 
debtor as a going concern,73 but it is difficult to conceive how to value a state.74 
A minimalist framework can nonetheless provide value without these 
incentives.75  Even if the framework does not completely solve the creditor-
holdout problem, the incentives discussed here should significantly increase the 
likelihood that a state and its creditors can reach consensual agreement 
notwithstanding the existence of holdout creditors.76 
3. Benefits 
A minimalist framework could help address political and constitutional 
concerns about state bankruptcy.  The National Governors Association has 
announced, for example, that the “nation’s governors strongly oppose federal 
proposals” to institute a Chapter 9–style state bankruptcy law.77  And in a recent 
  
71. Schwarcz, Subnational Debt, supra note 20, at 1222–23. 
72. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). 
73. See, e.g., Peter V. Pantaleo & Barry W. Ridings, Reorganization Value, 51 BUS. LAW. 419 
(1996) (explaining the relationship between cramdown and valuation). 
74. Schwarcz, Subnational Debt, supra note 20, at 1223.  There does not appear to be any precedent 
in which municipalities resorted to cramdown under Chapter 9, nor are commentators in 
agreement on how such a cramdown would be applied.  Compare McConnell & Picker, supra 
note 18, at 464–66 (questioning how municipal-bankruptcy cramdown would address 
unsecured creditor claims), with Richard Maloy, A Primer on Cramdown—How and Why It 
Works, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 55 (2003) (discussing municipal-bankruptcy cramdown, and 
superficially restating the corporate cramdown language without attempting to apply it in a 
municipal context). 
75. One could conceive of additional debt-restructuring incentives.  For example, the federal 
government could create a pot of money (smaller, of course, than the amount that would be 
needed for a bailout) to be distributed to a state that successfully restructures its debt within 
time limits.  The pot could even reduce over time to encourage a prompt restructuring.  To 
avoid motivating financially healthy states to restructure their debts to get the rewards, the 
framework could impose a financial test for restructuring.  But that could be hard to measure, 
and it might be degrading to a state legitimately wishing to use the framework.  The federal 
government also might consider penalty incentives.  A powerful penalty incentive, if politically 
viable, would be limiting the extent that interest on the bonds of a state that fails to negotiate 
in good faith would be exempt from federal taxation.  Cf. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 
505, 523–24 (1988) (holding that this tax exemption is not constitutionally required). 
76. See supra notes 58–69 and accompanying text. 
77. Chris Gregoire, Gov. of Wash. and Chair of the Nat’l Govs. Ass’n, & Dave Heineman, Gov. 
of Neb. and Vice Chair of the Nat’l Govs. Ass’n, NGA Statement Regarding Bankruptcy 
Proposals for States (Jan. 25, 2011). 
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congressional hearing, all but one of the testifying experts agreed that “enacting 
bankruptcy legislation for states has the potential to create more problems 
than it solves.”78 
A minimalist framework, in contrast, need not be promulgated as part of 
the Bankruptcy Code, nor need it use the terms bankruptcy or insolvency.79  
The framework would thereby mitigate the stigma of bankruptcy, making it more 
likely to be enacted and more likely that a state needing its protection would 
use it.80 
Moreover, a minimalist framework should be less likely to raise federal 
constitutional issues than a state bankruptcy chapter based on Chapter 9.  If, 
as this Article proposes, the state has the right to decide whether or not to apply 
the framework,81 its sovereignty would not be impugned by its choosing to 
apply the framework.82  And, once applied, the framework would modify 
creditor but not state rights.  The framework would therefore not undermine 
state sovereignty. 
Nor should the framework’s modification of creditor rights violate the 
Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits states, subject to 
certain case law exceptions, from impairing contractual obligations.83  Under 
these exceptions, only a substantial impairment of contractual obligations would 
otherwise violate the Contracts Clause.84  And even a substantial impairment 
would not violate the Contracts Clause if “the impairment is both reasonable 
and necessary to fulfill an important public purpose.”85  One could argue that 
  
78. Congress Hears Testimony on State Bankruptcy Option, BANKR. CT. DECISIONS, Feb. 22, 2011, 
at 6 (reporting on the Feb. 9, 2011, hearing before the House Oversight and Government 
Reform Committee’s subcommittee on TARP, Financial Services, and Private Programs).  
Professor David Skeel was the only testifying expert who argued in favor of a state bankruptcy 
option.  Id. 
79. See infra notes 92–96 and accompanying text (explaining why federal legislation retroactively 
imposing supermajority voting should be constitutional). 
80. Cf. Schwarcz, Subnational Debt, supra note 20, at 1245 (arguing that “[t]o preserve the dignity 
of municipalities seeking its protection and to avoid discouraging its use, [the proposed 
subnational debt-restructuring law] does not speak in terms of bankruptcy or insolvency, nor 
does it require a municipality to be insolvent to seek protection thereunder or otherwise 
differentiate between exogenous and endogenous factors that lead to default”). 
81. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
82. Cf. Skeel, Give States a Way to Go Bankrupt, supra note 10, at 22 (stating that there is no 
Tenth Amendment concern “[s]o long as a state can’t be thrown into bankruptcy against its 
will, and bankruptcy doesn’t usurp state lawmaking powers”). 
83. The Contracts Clause provides that “[n]o state shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation 
of Contracts . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
84. Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411 (1983) (quoting 
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978)). 
85. Seltzer v. Cochrane, 104 F.3d 234, 236 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Energy Reserves Grp., 459 U.S. 
at 411–12). 
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the framework fits within these exceptions.  For example, its supermajority 
voting should not substantially impair contractual obligations because dissen-
ters would be bound only by the supermajority vote of pari passu creditors; 
and even if such voting does substantially impair contractual obligations, the 
impairment is both reasonable and necessary to protect state financial integrity. 
We do not need to examine the merits of these arguments, however, 
because implementing the framework under federal law—as this Article 
proposes—should remove the framework from the scope of the Contracts 
Clause, which covers only state law impairment of contracts and not 
impairment that occurs wholly within a federal legal framework.  In In re 
Stewart,86 for example, the debtors in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case argued that 
their tax-exempt savings should be exempt from attachment by creditors 
pursuant to state law provisions that were incorporated by federal law.87  The 
trustee-in-bankruptcy countered that those savings should not be exempt 
because the state law provisions violated the Contracts Clause by “retroactively 
removing certain financial assets from the reach of creditors who relied on 
such assets when entering into contractual relationships [to extend credit].”88  
The court ruled that the “Contracts Clause attack is misplaced as a threshold 
matter” because the “Contracts Clause applies only to state, and not federal, 
laws.”89  Although the state law provisions impaired contractual obligations, 
they did so “only as modified by federal law and only as applied in the federal 
context of bankruptcy.”90 
This Article’s proposed federal framework may be even more clearly 
outside the scope of the Contracts Clause.  Consistent with In re Stewart, any 
impairment by a state of contractual obligations under the framework would 
occur only in accordance with federal law and only as applied in the federal 
context of a debt restructuring contemplated by the framework.  Bringing the 
framework even further outside the scope of the Contracts Clause (which 
focuses on state law impairment of contract91), a state would not, as in In re 
Stewart, need to enact state law to use the framework; it merely would choose 
to do so—although it is not inconceivable that a court might view a state’s 
making that choice as the de facto equivalent of enacting law. 
  
86. 246 B.R. 134 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2000). 
87. Id. at 135–36.  Federal law, the bankruptcy exemption in 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2), incorporated 
the state (New Hampshire) law provisions. 
88. In re Stewart, 246 B.R. at 140. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. (emphasis in original). 
91. See supra note 83. 
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A final constitutional question is whether the framework’s retroactive 
application to state debt issued before its promulgation under federal law 
might violate the Fifth Amendment, which provides “some protection against 
contractual impairment by the federal government.”92  It is clear that Congress 
has power under the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution to retroactively 
impair contractual obligations.93  But that power might not be applicable if 
the framework is promulgated outside of the Bankruptcy Code and does not 
use the terms bankruptcy or insolvency.94  Even without that power, however, the 
framework’s retroactive application should not violate the Fifth Amendment 
because retroactive federal legislation is constitutional so long as it does not 
constitute a “taking” by completely destroying property rights in a way that the 
affected parties could not have anticipated.95  The consensual relinquishment 
of rights under supermajority voting should not constitute complete 
destruction of creditor rights.  The only right that is completely destroyed is an 
individual creditor’s right to be a holdout; that right, however, is an unreasona-
ble private expectation that should not be protected.96 
4. Potential Drawbacks 
Although a minimalist framework could help to solve the creditor-holdout 
problem, it could have drawbacks.  Two potential drawbacks are immediately 
apparent: first, that the framework could increase financing costs,97 and 
second, that its application could be unfair to dissenting creditors who are bound 
by the supermajority voting.  These drawbacks could be addressed, however, in 
the design of the framework. 
First consider increased financing costs.  Creation of the framework might 
increase state financing costs by making it easier for a state to engage in a 
  
92. GELFAND, supra note 59. 
93. Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902). 
94. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
95. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528–29 (1998) (“[L]egislation might be unconstitutional 
if it imposes severe retroactive liability on a limited class of parties that could not have anticipated 
the liability . . . .”); United States v. Riverside Bay Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 128 n.5 (1985); 
Speckmann v. Paddock Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 469 (E.D. Mo. 1983). 
96. See Jan G. Laitos, Legislative Retroactivity, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 81, 100 
(1997); see also infra notes 111–113 and accompanying text. 
97. Cf. State Bankruptcy Debate Transfixes Nation, BANKR. CT. DECISIONS, Feb. 8, 2011, at 4 
(reporting that some commentators are concerned that enacting a full-blown Chapter 9–style 
state bankruptcy law could increase financing costs). 
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debt restructuring that reduces the value of creditor claims.98  Empirical 
evidence in a related context suggests, however, that any such increase would 
likely be marginal.99  Financially healthy states should not experience even a 
marginal increase; if an increase does occur, it should primarily impact states 
facing financial difficulty because only a financially troubled state would 
have an incentive to apply the framework.100  Moreover, as explained below, 
any such increase would only apply prior to a state’s application of the framework 
(an ex ante cost increase). 
Any such increase in financing costs would be offset by the cost decrease 
of states that actually apply the framework.  Such an ex post cost decrease should 
result from a state’s using the framework to reduce its debt burden, thereby 
resolving its financial difficulty.  Although it is possible, at least for a short period 
after a debt restructuring under the framework, that a state might face higher 
financing costs from investors upset about the state’s use of the framework,101 the 
  
98. Cf. Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 578 (1998) 
(observing that ex post modification of creditors’ rights by “[s]ubstantive rules implemented 
exclusively in bankruptcy” can have adverse effects such as increasing borrowing costs). 
99. Michael Bradley, James D. Cox & Mitu Gulati, The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks and 
Their Antidotes: Lessons From the Sovereign Debt Market, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 295–97 
(2010) (finding that the inclusion of collective action clauses in sovereign bond indentures, 
which enable supermajority voting to change essential payment terms, did not measurably 
increase sovereign borrowing costs).  The IMF has argued that observing the impact of collective 
action clauses on sovereign borrowing costs should be somewhat representative of the impact 
of its proposed SDRM.  See Anne O. Krueger, First Deputy Managing Dir., IMF, Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring Mechanism—One Year Later: Address to the European Commission in 
Brussels, Belgium (Dec. 10, 2002) (transcript available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/ 
speeches/2002/121002.htm) (observing that implementation of the SDRM could even 
reduce country borrowing costs by facilitating greater incentives for countries to enact sound 
fiscal policies, a shorter negotiation process, and higher recovery rates for creditors, and 
suggesting that the cost impact could be measured indirectly through empirical studies of 
collective action clauses in bond indentures). 
100. A financially healthy state that opts to apply the framework would likely find it difficult if 
not impossible to persuade a supermajority of its creditors to agree to any debt restructuring 
that impairs essential terms of the debt.  Cf. supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the 
reiterative process needed for a state and its creditors to reach a mutually agreeable restructuring 
plan).  But by opting to apply the framework, the state would be signaling financial trouble, 
which would likely raise its financing costs. 
101. Compare Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of David Skeel, Professor of Law, Univ. of Pa.), 
available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/Skeel_Congressional_Testimony. 
pdf (stating that if a state were to declare bankruptcy, “the impact would be very limited” on 
the borrowing abilities of healthier states), with id. (statement by Nicole Gelinas, Fellow, 
Manhattan Inst.) (disagreeing with Skeel because “[m]arkets can distinguish among states but 
they cannot do it instantaneously or even in a few weeks or even months”). 
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state’s financing costs will ultimately turn on the credit rating of its bonds.102  
And application of the framework to reduce the state’s debt burden should 
improve that credit rating.103 
Whether the framework would increase or decrease state financing costs 
is ultimately an empirical question, depending on whether ex ante cost increases 
exceed ex post cost decreases.104  But even if there were a cost increase, it should 
be viewed with an eye toward the alternative:105 a state debt default, which 
would be much more likely to occur absent the framework and which “would 
make it obscenely expensive for all states to borrow.”106  And the alternative of 
a federal bailout to prevent default would have its own high costs.107 
  
102. Telephone Interview With Alan Hirsch, supra note 60; cf. Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of 
Rep. Mike Quigley) (observing that the low credit rating of Illinois bonds “was costing Illinois 
taxpayers $551 million extra per year in interest payments”). 
103. Schwarcz, supra note 60, at 8; see also supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (observing 
that easing a state’s debt burden should help to increase the state’s credit rating). 
104. This should be a Kaldor-Hicks determination, focusing on overall state costs and not 
necessarily on individual states.  A transaction is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if its aggregate benefits 
exceed its aggregate costs, considering all affected parties (including third parties).  RICHARD 
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13 (6th ed. 2003).   
105. Cf. Letter From Richard Levin, Vice Chair, Nat’l Bankr. Conf., to the Subcomm. on Admin. 
Oversight & the Cts., U.S. Senate (Sept. 15, 2010) (in support of S. 3675, the “Small 
Business Jobs Preservation Act of 2010”) (on file with author) (observing that “any bankruptcy 
law that permits rehabilitation can raise the price of credit or limit access to it,” but it must 
be balanced against “the gains to society” more generally). 
106. Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Rep. Mike Quigley); cf. Statement of the Nat’l Bankr. 
Conf., supra note 12, at 18 (indicating that bankruptcy of Orange County, California, “negatively 
affected the cost and availability of municipal finance generally”). 
107. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text (discussing moral hazard and the too-big-to-fail 
dilemma).  The framework theoretically could allow individual states to decide to opt out, thereby 
signaling to the marketplace (by opting out) that the state has faith in its own financial 
security.  In this vein, some scholars have argued that companies should be able to opt out of 
the “default rule” of corporate bankruptcy law, enabling them to negotiate contractual provisions 
that better fit their financial situations.  See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu 
Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 53–54 (1992); Alan Schwartz, A 
Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1849–50 (1998).  
Other scholars, however, have countered that such a contractual approach to bankruptcy 
overstates efficiency and inadequately addresses transaction costs.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren 
& Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1253–54 (2005).  In the sovereign nation context, at least one scholar 
suggests that if there were a debt-restructuring convention, it would be “possible and perhaps 
desirable to allow for opt-outs.”  Patrick Bolton, Toward a Statutory Approach to Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring: Lessons From Corporate Bankruptcy Practice Around the World, 50 IMF 
STAFF PAPERS 41, 50 (2003).  He later hints, however, that such an opt-out would be solely 
for political purposes.  Id. at 66 (referring to this as a possible “compromise with debtor nations 
that have expressed strong reservations about the proposed new statutory regime by letting them 
opt out of part or all of the new procedure ex ante”).  More attention needs to be given to the 
question of opting out.  In the state context, for example, would opting out by financially healthy 
states increase costs for less healthy states?  If so, would less healthy states then be motivated to 
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The second drawback is that, by enabling a supermajority of creditors to 
effectively bind a nonconsenting minority of creditors to a debt-restructuring 
plan, the framework would prevent holdouts from exercising their contrac-
tual rights.  Although this type of concern is typical of any majoritarian voting 
scheme,108 it is mitigated by the supermajority requirement.  Still, the framework 
should be designed to minimize contractual interference and safeguard 
against unfairness. 
The framework attempts to achieve these safeguards in several ways.  
As mentioned,109 the state itself would opt for application of the framework.  
This not only preserves the state’s dignity but also prevents majority creditors 
from strategically using the framework to bully minority creditors.  Under the 
framework, the state and its creditors would be bound to supermajority voting 
in which the vote by the overwhelming majority of substantially similar (at 
least pari passu) creditors for a debt-restructuring plan would legally bind both 
dissenting and majority creditors.  This further protects minority creditors by 
binding them to a plan only if pari passu majority creditors agree to the plan; 
thus, holdouts and dissenters would be affected by the plan in the same way 
the supermajority is affected.110 
A holdout may nonetheless complain that this scheme deprives it of the 
contractual right to be a holdout.  Although, technically, a holdout would be so 
deprived, it is questionable whether this type of right should be protected 
by law.  The Supreme Court has ruled that a creditor “whose selfish purpose [is] 
to obstruct a fair and feasible [debt restructuring] in the hope that someone 
would pay them more than the ratable” share could be viewed as acting in bad 
faith.111  Courts have also found bad faith when a dissenting creditor attempts 
to block a debt-restructuring plan in order to protect a competing legitimate 
  
opt out, creating somewhat of a Faustian bargain whereby those states might benefit from a 
short term rate reduction at the risk of being unable to restructure their debts if their financial 
condition worsens? 
108. Marcel Kahan, Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-Off Between Individual and Collective 
Rights, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1040, 1041–43 (2002). 
109. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
110. Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 956, 1006 (2000); cf. David Arthur Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate 
Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461, 489–90 (1992) (suggesting that 
supermajority voting provides more than adequate protection for nonconsenting minority 
creditors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy because all creditors of the same class are bound by the 
majority’s decision). 
111. Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 211 (1945); see also Laitos, supra note 96. 
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interest.112  Bankruptcy law deprives creditors who act in bad faith from even 
having the right to vote on a debt-restructuring plan.113 
Furthermore, “prepackaged” bankruptcy, which epitomizes superma-
jority voting, is one of the most widely accepted and admired uses of 
corporate bankruptcy law.114  Prepackaged bankruptcy is merely the application 
of bankruptcy law to harness the power of supermajority voting to enable a 
debtor and its creditors to effectuate a voluntarily negotiated debt-restructuring 
plan—that is, one negotiated outside of bankruptcy, and thus without the 
additional incentives discussed above115—on all creditors notwithstanding 
the objections of holdout creditors.116  The use of a minimalist framework to help 
solve the creditor-holdout problem would thus be closely analogous to the use 
of prepackaged bankruptcy.117 
The widespread application of prepackaged bankruptcy and the relative 
paucity of objections to its use118—quite the contrary, some commentators 
  
112. Figter, Ltd. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assoc., 118 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that a 
shareholder acts in bad faith by buying debt claims in order to attempt to block a debt-
restructuring plan that, the shareholder believes, treats shareholders unfairly); In re Allegheny 
Int’l, Inc., 118 B.R. 282, 289–90 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (finding that a party acted in bad 
faith by attempting to gain control of the debtor to block a debt-restructuring plan and 
substitute that party’s own debt-restructuring plan). 
113. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2006). 
114. See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS 
AND CREDITORS 840–41 (4th ed. 2001) (observing that proponents of prepackaged bankruptcy 
regard it as “the best of both worlds” and also that “[t]he use of [prepackaged bankruptcy] has grown 
with astonishing speed among large companies,” averaging around 10 percent of all bankruptcy 
cases).  I am not claiming that the fact that supermajority voting is widespread and has long 
been used in bankruptcy law should be dispositive of the normative merits of that type of 
voting.  Cf. ALAN SCHWARTZ & ROBERT E. SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 18 (2d ed. 1991) (contending that “‘oughts’ cannot be derived 
from what is” (citing G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 10–14 (1971))).  I am merely claiming 
that this fact provides some evidence of how supermajority voting would be viewed under 
existing norms.  See infra notes 118–120 and accompanying text. 
115. See supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text. 
116. See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 11.23, at 1130–32 (2d ed. 
2009) (discussing prepackaged bankruptcy).  A prepackaged bankruptcy is filed under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1126(b) in order to bind holdout creditors under 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c).  TABB, supra, at 1130–31. 
117. Indeed, prepackaged bankruptcies are “most useful in cases where [as with states] the debtor 
does not need to revise its business, but simply needs to overhaul its capital structure.”  TABB, 
supra note 116, at 1131. 
118. The only criticism is qualified.  See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 114, at 842 (observing 
that although holdout “creditors that are rolled over in a prepackaged [bankruptcy] plan 
sometimes face a difficult task to fight a steamroller confirmation, much to their consternation,” 
those consenting to the plan “see it as Chapter 11 at its best”); David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy 
Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts on Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REV. 1, 28 (1998) (noting 
that some prepackaged bankruptcies may favor large institutional investors at the expense of 
scattered general creditors, but arguing that the concern is outweighed by the benefits such 
as cost savings, time savings, and smaller deviations from absolute priority). 
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praise it as a “magical device”119—is at least some evidence that supermajority 
voting under this Article’s proposed framework should not be viewed as unfair 
under existing norms.  The framework’s lack of a mechanism to cram down a 
debt-restructuring plan over the objections of a class of holdout creditors120 
should further reinforce that view. 
5. Certain Complications 
The analysis so far does not specifically address how, if at all, the framework 
should treat state collective bargaining and pension agreements, nor does it 
address how the framework should address debt issued not by a state per se 
but by one of its authorities or other legal entities.  I consider these issues in turn. 
State-sponsored pension agreements have been calculated to have shortfalls 
exceeding $3 trillion,121 and the Wisconsin legislature recently battled over the 
elimination of collective bargaining rights for state employees.122  These issues 
are highly politicized, and any inclusion of an explicit right in the framework 
to impair collective bargaining or pension agreements would almost certainly 
engender significant opposition.   
Bankruptcy law does not even clearly give that right to municipalities.  The 
explicit right to impair collective bargaining agreements is limited in bankruptcy 
law to corporate reorganizations,123 and even the staunchest scholarly advocate 
for state bankruptcy admits doubt about bankruptcy law permitting the rene-
gotiation of municipal pension agreements.124  A federal district court recently 
upheld a bankruptcy court’s ruling that a municipality (Vallejo, California) may 
nonetheless impair its collective bargaining agreements,125 but that ruling is 
  
119. TABB, supra note 116, at 1130; see also DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY: MATERIALS 
AND CASES 343 (3d ed. 2010) (“In some cases, parties have been negotiating long and hard 
before the bankruptcy case is even filed.  A majority of creditors may have agreed to a sensible 
[debt-restructuring] plan, but some creditors may be ‘holding out,’ trying to use their leverage as 
holdouts to extract special deals for their particular consent.  In such cases, [allowing the holdouts 
to undermine the debt-restructuring plan] would be economic waste . . . .”). 
120. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. 
121. Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh, The Liabilities and Risks of State-Sponsored Pension 
Plans, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 192 (2009), available at www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/ 
rauh/research/JEP_Fall2009.pdf. 
122. Monica Davey & A.G. Sulzberger, In Wisconsin Battle on Unions, State Democrats See a Gift, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2011, at A1.  
123. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2006) (specifying which provisions of bankruptcy law outside of 
Chapter 9 also apply in Chapter 9), with id. § 1113 (permitting rejection of collective bargaining 
agreements, which is not specified in 11 U.S.C. § 901). 
124. Skeel, Give States a Way to Go Bankrupt, supra note 10, at 24. 
125. In re City of Vallejo, 432 B.R. 262 (E.D. Cal. 2010), aff’g 403 B.R. 72 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009) 
(holding that because Chapter 9 does not incorporate 11 U.S.C. § 1113, municipalities have 
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controversial.  The ruling inadequately addressed bankruptcy law’s explicit 
limitation on impairing collective bargaining agreements.126  And the City of 
Vallejo ultimately decided not to impair its collective bargaining agreements 
due to the likely political backlash.127 
Furthermore, the common portrayal of state pension debt, such as the $3 
trillion figure mentioned,128 is misleading.  Although “state governments often 
run large pension funds through state trusts . . . , it is local governments, 
including cities, towns, and school districts, not the state governments, that 
owe the bulk of what people think of as ‘state’ pension benefits.”129  A prominent 
rating agency recently reported, for example, that 
[s]tates are often one of many contributing participants in [pension] 
systems that they manage, with no clear obligation for the portion of 
the liability that is not associated with their own employees.  In some 
cases, even though the state controls the system, no state employees 
are covered under the plan and the state does not contribute to 
the plan . . . .130 
Similarly, when rating a state’s creditworthiness, that rating agency confirmed 
that it “generally focus[es] on the portion [of pension liability] that is the 
state’s responsibility.”131 
  
the right to reject collective bargaining agreements under 11 U.S.C. § 365, which generally 
permits contract breach, as interpreted by prior case law before 11 U.S.C. § 1113 was enacted). 
126. The In re City of Vallejo opinions do not adequately address how their holdings square with 11 
U.S.C. § 1113(f), which provides that “[n]o provision of this title [11] shall be construed to permit 
a [party in bankruptcy] to unilaterally terminate or alter any provisions of a collective bargaining 
agreement prior to compliance with the provisions of this section.”  Title 11 includes all of federal 
bankruptcy law, including municipal bankruptcy under Chapter 9. 
127. See, e.g., Dennis J. Drebsky & Ann E. Chernicoff, Extending Chapter 9 to States Would Present 
Hurdles, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 21, 2011, at 12 (observing that, notwithstanding the court decisions 
in In re City of Vallejo, “the city delayed rejection in favor of continued negotiations with its 
major unions” and that invocation of this “nuclear option” could have “devastating” effects on 
state services). 
128. See text accompanying note 121, supra. 
129. Hearing, supra note 1 (testimony of Nicole Gelinas). 
130. Douglas Offerman et al., Enhancing the Analysis of U.S. State and Local Government Pension 
Obligations, FITCH RATINGS, Feb. 17, 2011, at 3 (although also observing that “many states 
contribute to the pensions of employees [such as teachers] of lower levels of government to 
varying degrees”).  Some states do not contribute as an employer to state-run pension plans 
that cover municipal employees but nonetheless guarantee the benefit.  Id. at 3–4. 
131. Telephone Interview With Laura Porter, Managing Dir. of Fitch, Inc., and head of Fitch’s 
States Grp. (May 11, 2011) (notes on file with author); see also Offerman et al., supra note 130, 
at 1–2 (“Fitch believes that allocating the entire unfunded [pension] liability of a multiemployer 
system to a state just because it manages the system would overstate the burden on the state 
and understate the commitments of the participating local governments that are actually 
responsible for unfunded obligations of the system.”). 
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On balance, therefore, this Article proposes that the framework not include 
an explicit right to impair state collective bargaining and pension agreements. 
Consider next how the framework should address the complication of debt 
issued not by a state per se, but by one of its authorities or other legal entities.  
For example, some 
states have made their commitments to creditors not through single 
“state” entities that could go before a bankruptcy judge with one 
voice, but through hundreds, in some cases thousands, of legal entities.  
Each of these legal entities has its own pre-existing agreements with 
bondholders and other creditors, set out in individual contracts and 
in state laws.  An illustration: When many people think of state bond 
obligations, they think of “general obligation” debt—that is, debt for 
which states have obliged their “full faith and credit” to pay.  But a 
state such as New York, for example, with one of the highest per-
capita debt burdens in the nation, owes only $3.5 billion in “general 
obligation” debt.  New York owes the remainder of its $78.4 billion 
in debt through hundreds of special “authorities,” including the 
Transitional Finance Authority, Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority, the Dormitory Authority, and others.132 
This arrangement would exacerbate the creditor-holdout problem if the 
issuing authority’s debt is state debt that is not pari passu with other debt of 
the state.133  Holders of the authority’s debt could then have the right to vote 
as a separate class under the framework, enabling them (if they choose) to be 
holdouts vis-à-vis the other state debt treated in the plan.134 
Nonetheless, the framework’s across-the-board supermajority voting could 
still be powerfully applied.  For example, all state guarantees of debt issued by 
state authorities and all other state debt could be voted as a single class, so 
long as those guarantees and other debt claims are pari passu.  If those guarantees 
and other debt claims are backed by the state’s full faith and credit, they would 
almost certainly be pari passu.135 
Furthermore, to the extent politically and economically feasible, a state 
could even use the framework to restructure its full-faith-and-credit debt in a 
  
132. Hearing, supra note 1 (testimony of Nicole Gelinas). 
133. To the extent that a state is not itself obligated to pay authority debt, see infra notes 137–139 
and accompanying text. 
134. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
135. As a parallel, for example, where (as is common in my experience) the debt of various issuers in 
a corporate group is guaranteed by the strongest member of the group, a single debt-
restructuring plan for the strongest member’s debt would modify all such guaranty claims, such 
claims being in substance pari passu with debt issued directly by that member. 
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plan that excludes debt whose recourse is solely to individual state authorities.136  
Although an individual state authority could separately use the framework to 
try to restructure its own debt,137 the state would not need to participate in 
that effort.  If the authority fails to restructure its debt, the consequences to the 
state of the authority’s default may be limited.138  And if the consequences 
are likely to be significant, such as where the authority engages in an important 
public function (for example, running transportation), the state could reconsti-
tute a new authority to perform that function.139  The state could even give that 
new authority credibility by backing it with its full faith and credit. 
B. Ensuring Liquidity During the Debt-Restructuring Process 
Even if the framework achieves its debt-restructuring goals perfectly, a 
state may need to borrow to pay current expenses, such as employee wages 
and energy costs, during the debt-restructuring process.  A financially troubled 
state, however, will have difficulty borrowing new money unless the lender is 
given priority over the state’s existing claims.140 
  
136. Cf. Email From Richard C. Schragger, supra note 9 (“Why shouldn’t those . . . authorities 
stand or fall on their own?  Why treat those entities as having ‘state’ debt at all [since] many are 
created to avoid state debt limitations in the first place?”). 
137. A state authority, if it qualifies for Chapter 9 bankruptcy, might instead opt to restructure its 
debts that way.  Cf. In re Las Vegas Monorail Corp., 429 B.R. 770, 788–90 (Bankr. C.D. Nev. 
2010) (examining whether a governmental entity falls within the definition of a municipality 
eligible for Chapter 9 bankruptcy by considering whether the entity has “sovereign” powers 
such as taxation or eminent domain, whether the entity operates for the public purpose, the 
degree of state control, and whether the state designates or treats the entity as an instrumentality 
of the state). 
138. See, e.g., Richard Williamson, Texas Sports Agency Flirting With Default, BOND BUYER, 
Aug. 31, 2010, http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/119_416/texas-agency-flirting-with-
default-1016658-1.html (discussing the likely default by the Harris County–Houston Sports 
Authority on $988 million of debt, which was used to construct three professional sports stadiums).  
But cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Use and Abuse of Special-Purpose Entities in Public Finance 
(work in progress) (on file with author) (examining, among other things, the extent to which a 
state is likely to try to prevent default by a state authority on debt for which the state itself is 
not legally obligated); Email From W. Bartley Hildreth, Professor of Pub. Mgmt. & Pol’y, 
Ga. State Univ. Andrew Young Sch. of Pol’y Studies, to author (Apr. 25, 2011) (on file with 
author) (observing that, in 1984, the State of Ohio stood behind its water development authority’s 
debt in order to reduce rating-agency scrutiny of a technical default on that debt). 
139. To enable a state to allow an authority to default, the framework should provide that such 
default will not trigger a cross-default in any other debt of the state or its authorities. 
140. Cf. Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Redesigning the International Lender of Last Resort, 6 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 177, 186–87 (2005) (explaining this difficulty in the context of a nation trying 
to obtain financing during a debt restructuring); Schwarcz, Subnational Debt, supra note 20, at 
1206–07 (explaining this difficulty in the context of a subnational governmental entity trying to 
obtain financing during a debt restructuring). 
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If the federal government were to provide this liquidity, it could designate 
its own priority.  But it may be preferable politically to privatize this funding.  
To achieve this, there should be a mechanism to give priority to new-money 
lenders, while protecting existing creditors (who become subordinated to the 
new-money loans). 
Although a state could legislate a priority under its own laws, new-
money lenders might find that insufficient.  They might worry, for example, 
that the priority may not be enforceable against out-of-state creditors, or that 
a politicized state legislature could later change the priority to the lenders’ 
disadvantage.  Existing creditors might also worry that a priority created by a 
state under pressure to borrow will not give them sufficient notice and 
opportunity to block a new-money loan if, for example, they believe its amount 
is too high—creating a risk of overinvestment—or its terms are onerous to the 
state (and thus indirectly onerous to the state’s creditors).  A priority borrowing 
mechanism promulgated under federal law in the manner described below 
should be more attractive to both new-money lenders and existing creditors.141 
Bankruptcy law provides helpful precedent on how a debtor can attract 
new-money loans while protecting existing creditors.  New-money lenders are 
granted a priority under an auction arrangement, in which lenders bid to make 
the loan and the debtor chooses the loan with the most attractive terms.142  
Existing creditors are protected by having the right to object to a new-money 
loan.143  Existing creditors are further protected because a debtor that abuses 
new-money lending privileges would likely face difficulty receiving supermajority 
creditor approval for a debt-restructuring plan. 
  
141. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE 
L.J. 425 (1997) (showing that new-money secured loans are generally efficient and fair). 
142. 11 U.S.C. § 364(a)–(d) (2006). 
143. Id. § 364(b)–(d) (requiring notice and a hearing for all new-money borrowings other than 
unsecured debt incurred in the ordinary course).  As discussed supra notes 140–141 and 
accompanying text, existing creditors may object that the amount of the new-money loan is too 
high or its terms are too onerous.  Although identifying a supervisory authority to hear and 
adjudicate objections in the state context is ultimately a political choice, any such authority 
should ideally be neutral while not raising concerns over state sovereignty.  For example, the 
authority could be a body of prominent members of respected institutions (such as the American 
College of Bankruptcy).  The authority also might be modeled on the mechanism for resolving 
disputes between investors and sovereigns in the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
under which bondholders and a state would each unilaterally appoint a member to a three-member 
committee, with the third member chosen by mutual agreement.  See Daniel M. Price, An 
Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter: Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement, 27 INT’L LAW. 727, 731–33 (1993). 
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This same type of auction arrangement could be applied equally well in a 
state context.  Because most state debt is unsecured,144 it should be sufficient to 
give new-money lenders priority over unsecured creditors only.145  That would 
avoid any concern that subordinating claims of secured creditors against their 
collateral could raise issues under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.146 
Finally, whatever the funding source or mechanism, a new-money lender 
might wish to impose conditionality—conditioning the lending on the state’s 
agreeing to adopt more fiscally responsible measures (such as balancing the 
state budget).147  Although the federal government is more likely than a private 
lender to wish to impose conditionality, the framework could effectuate both 
by funneling private lending through the federal government in a back-to-
back lending structure.148  There would appear to be little, if any, constitutional 
impediment to imposing conditionality.149  States, however, may oppose a 
framework that allows conditionality, preferring instead a federal government 
bailout.  The federal government could address this perverse incentive by sig-
naling that it will not engage in bailouts or by signaling its intent to impose 
more severe conditionality on any bailout it might consider. 
CONCLUSION 
In response to massive budget deficits, states have been turning to austerity 
measures, tax increases, privatization of services, and renegotiation of collective 
bargaining agreements.  But states will also need debt relief if their debt burden 
  
144. Edwards, supra note 31 (observing that most bonds are backed by full faith and credit). 
145. Even in a corporate bankruptcy context, new-money lenders almost never get priority over 
secured creditors.  11 U.S.C. § 364(d). 
146. A security interest is considered a property right, namely, the right to have the value of the 
collateral applied to payment of the secured creditor’s claim.  Julia Patterson Forrester, Bankruptcy 
Takings, 51 FLA. L. REV. 851, 876–77 (1999) (citing Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 
311 U.S. 273, 278–79 (1940); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bartels, 308 U.S. 180, 186–
87 (1939)). 
147. Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 110, at 963 (discussing conditionality imposed in a sovereign debt-
restructuring context by the IMF). 
148. Id. at 990–91 (examining the potential, in a sovereign debt-restructuring context, for the IMF 
to continue to impose conditionality through a back-to-back lending structure even when funding 
has been privatized).  Back-to-back lending occurs when A lends money to B, who then lends 
that money to C.  
149. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987) (explaining Congress’s broad ability to 
attach conditions to federal funding under the taxing and spending powers of Article I of the 
U.S. Constitution so long as the conditions are for the “general welfare,” clear and unambiguous, 
related to the program for which they are provided, and not otherwise unconstitutional). 
A Minimalist Approach to State “Bankruptcy” 349 
 
is so crushing that reasonable efforts at fiscal reform will fail to avoid default 
without a federal government bailout.150 
Some advocate solving state debt problems by, effectively, extending munic-
ipal bankruptcy law to states.  That approach, however, brings in excess baggage, 
engendering political opposition and constitutional concerns, which in turn can 
obscure consideration of potentially useful applications of bankruptcy law. 
A simpler solution is available: Enable states to work out their debt 
problems with their creditors.  The main obstacle to achieving a debt restructur-
ing is likely to be the creditor-holdout problem.  Although contractual responses 
(such as collective action clauses) to the creditor-holdout problem are seriously 
limited, a minimalist legal framework incorporating certain limited bankruptcy 
protections would not only help states solve that problem but would also help 
to address the political and constitutional concerns.  By being consensual and 
avoiding the stigma of bankruptcy, such a framework would preserve state sove-
reignty and have a higher likelihood of being enacted and used by a state 
needing its protection.  Potential drawbacks of a minimalist framework could be 
addressed through design of the framework. 
A minimalist framework also can enable a state to obtain needed liquidity 
during the debt-restructuring process.  Although the federal government could 
provide this liquidity, the framework would enable the liquidity source to 
be privatized. 
  
150. Cf. supra notes 3–8 and accompanying text (arguing that state debt relief could help to mitigate 
the suffering of residents of financially troubled states, minimize externalities that go beyond 
troubled states, reduce moral hazard, and prevent state debt defaults from possibly triggering 
systemic consequences). 
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APPENDIX A. MODEL FEDERAL STATUTE  
FOR STATE DEBT RESTRUCTURING 
Chapter I—Scope, and Use of Terms 
§ 1.  SCOPE 
This statute applies to debt restructurings between States and their 
creditors. 
§ 2.  USE OF TERMS 
For purposes of this statute: 
(1) “Consenting State” means a State that has invoked application of this 
statute in accordance with its terms; 
(2) “creditor” means an entity that has a claim for payment against a 
Consenting State; 
(3) “Plan” means a debt restructuring plan; 
(4) “Supervisory Authority” means ________.151 
 
Chapter II—Invoking Application of the Statute 
§ 3.  PETITION FOR RELIEF 
(1) A State may invoke application of this statute by filing a petition for 
relief with the Supervisory Authority. 
(2) Immediately after such a petition for relief has been filed, the provisions 
of this statute shall apply to the relationship between the Consenting State and 
its creditors. 
§ 4.  NOTIFICATION OF CREDITORS 
Within 30 days after filing its petition for relief, the Consenting State shall 
notify its known creditors of its intention to negotiate a Plan under this statute. 
 
Chapter III—The Debt Restructuring Plan 
§ 5.  SUBMISSION OF PLAN 
(1) The Consenting State may submit a Plan to its creditors at any time, 
and may submit alternative Plans from time to time. 
(2) No other person or entity may submit a Plan. 
§ 6.  CONTENTS OF PLAN 
A Plan shall: 
(1) designate classes of claims in accordance with § 7(3); 
  
151. The model statute does not purport to choose the Supervisory Authority.  For a discussion about 
how that choice might be made, see supra note 143. 
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(2) specify the proposed treatment of each class of claims; and 
(3) provide the same treatment for each claim of a particular class, unless 
the holder of a claim agrees to a less favorable treatment. 
§ 7.  VOTING ON THE PLAN 
(1) A Plan shall become effective and binding on the Consenting State 
and its creditors when it has been submitted by the Consenting State and agreed 
to by each class of such creditors’ claims.  Thereupon, the Consenting State shall 
be discharged from any debt encompassed by the Plan, except to the extent 
provided in the Plan. 
(2) A class of claims has agreed to a Plan if creditors holding at least [two-
thirds] in amount and more than [one-half] in number of the claims of such 
class [voting on such Plan152] [entitled to vote on such Plan] agree to the Plan. 
(3) Each class of claims shall consist of claims against the Consenting 
State that are pari passu in priority, provided that pari passu claims need not all 
be included in the same class. 
 
Chapter IV—Financing the Restructuring 
§ 8.  TERMS OF LENDING 
(1) The Supervisory Authority shall have the right, but not the obligation, 
to lend money to a Consenting State on such terms and conditions as the 
Supervisory Authority deems appropriate,153 taking into account the Consenting 
State’s use of the loan proceeds and any objections raised by creditors pursuant 
to § 8(2). 
(2) Any loan by the Supervisory Authority under § 8(1) shall be made 
only after notice to the State’s known creditors of the intention to make such 
loan and the proposed terms and conditions thereof, and a hearing at which 
those creditors shall have the right to object to the loan. 
§ 9.  PRIORITY OF REPAYMENT 
(1) Consenting States must repay loans made by the Supervisory Authority 
prior to paying any other claims. 
(2) Such priority of payment shall extend to any assignee of such loans. 
§ 10.  NONRECOURSE BORROWING BY SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY 
(1) To finance its lending to a Consenting State, the Supervisory Authority 
may borrow on such terms and conditions as it may negotiate, provided that 
  
152. The Plan can be more easily approved if this alternative is selected, but then reliable notice to 
creditors becomes more important. 
153. Chapter IV of the model statute, including § 8(1), would enable the Supervisory Authority to 
impose conditionality pursuant to a back-to-back lending structure, as discussed supra notes 147–
148 and accompanying text. 
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neither the Supervisory Authority nor its assets shall be liable, contingently or 
otherwise, for repayment of such borrowing except to the extent the Supervisory 
Authority specifically agrees. 
(2) As collateral for a borrowing, the Supervisory Authority may assign 
as security its right to payment under the loan made from the proceeds of 
such borrowing. 
APPENDIX B. FLOWCHART ILLUSTRATING POSSIBLE APPLICATION  
OF THE FEDERAL STATUTE FOR STATE DEBT RESTRUCTURING 
See next page for a highly simplified example of how the Statute might 
work.  The numbers used in this example are intended to be explanatory only and 
are not necessarily realistic. 
 









































Issue.  Notwithstanding diligent efforts to raise taxes, reduce costs, and otherwise engage
in fiscal reform, State X faces a budget shortfall that would prevent it from paying principal
and interest on its debt and still maintain essential government services.
Invoking Application of the Statute for State Debt Restructuring.  State X files a 
petition for relief with the Supervisory Authority.
Notification.  Within 30 days of filing the
petition, State X notifies its known creditors
of its intention to negotiate a Plan under
the Statute. 
The Plan.  State X submits a Plan to its
creditors designating (pari passu) classes of 
claims and proposed repayment terms for
each class: 
Class 1: Maturity dates extended 2 years. 
Class 2: Maturity dates extended 1 year
and interest rates reduced by 2 percent. 
Class 3: Principal amounts reduced
10 percent. 
Vote.  Classes 1 and 2 vote to approve, but
Class 3 disapproves (i.e., less than the req-
uisite supermajority of Class 3 creditors vote
for approval). 
Updated Plan.  State X revises and resubmits
Plan to creditors. 
Class 1: Maturity dates extended 2 years. 
Class 2: Maturity dates extended 1 year
and interest rates reduced by 2 percent. 
Class 3: Maturity dates extended 4 years
and interest rates reduced by 1.5 percent.
Agreement.  Requisite supermajority of cred-
itors in each Class vote for approval.  The
Updated Plan becomes binding on all
creditors (i.e., Classes 1, 2, and 3). 
Financing.  After discussions between
Supervisory Authority and State X,
Supervisory Authority proposes to lend
$Y billion to State X to help it pay its
current expenses during the debt-
restructuring process. 
Supervisory Authority notifies the State’s
known creditors of its intention to make
the loan and the proposed terms and
conditions thereof. 
Supervisory Authority holds a hearing, at
which creditors have the right to object to
the loan. 
Taking those objections into account,
Supervisory Authority decides to rene-
gotiate certain terms of the proposed loan. 
Supervisory Authority borrows $Y billion
on a nonrecourse basis from private
lenders, on-lends the loan proceeds to
State X, and pledges its first-priority right
to payment from State X as collateral to
the private lenders. 
